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During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the public credit market of the 
Spanish Empire used the Genoese and Portuguese bankers’ to intermediate on 
their behalf. They leant money to the Spanish Crown (asientos) and offered 
many other financial services all around Europe. The asientos was a typical 
form of short term borrowing which paid high rates of interest reimbursed in 
silver (bullion and coins), which could be sold to many different private 
economic agents and public mints all over Europe. The objective of this article 
is to analyse, within the environment of the international silver market, the role 
played by some of the European mints who were directly interested in this type 
of financial intermediation.  While the production levels of the mints in Genoa 
and London depended more on the financial market that of Lisbon was derived 
from a purely commercial market. 
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The mechanisms and circuits of distribution for silver in the modern age turns out to be a 
historiographical question that is still open.  The authors who have dedicated themselves to this 
research have not even been able to come together on data that is only partially agreed.  There are 
many reasons for this: mainly it comes down to the enormous volume of documentation collected by 
the Spanish administration which has often been dispersed across various colonial archives, and 
has consequently been produced with a lack of coherence and uniformity.  It is also necessary to 
remember that the levels of production of various mines have often been recorded in places that are 
far apart from one another: from Mexico to Peru, from Colombia to Bolivia.  The figures for the 
quantity actually sent outside of the American continent constitute another problem for interpretation.  
As will be seen below, the studies undertaken from the early 1800s have supplied figures which 
often vary greatly between them.  The problem is then complicated if you want to define the quantity 
of gold and silver that actually arrived in Europe.  The main destination for the silver was obviously 
Spain, in that almost all of the area in which the precious metals were produced was in territories 
controlled by the Iberian crown.  Over the course of the past century, we have seen a number of 
scholars contribute to the debate regarding the quantity of precious metal that arrived in Europe, 
including Ramón Carande2, Pierre Chaunu3, Antonio Domínguez Ortiz4, Carmen Bancora Cañero5, 
Maria Encarnación Rodríguez Vicente6, Ruiz Rivera, García Fuentes, García-Baquero González7, 
Kindleberger8 and more recently Romano9, Álvarez Nogal10, Bernal Rodríguez11, Yun Casalilla12 and 
________________________ 
1 Claudio Marsilio is Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia of Portugal, linked to the 
Gabinete de História Económica e Social (GHES) - Universidade de Lisboa (bolsa nº SFRH/BPD/72316/2010). 
cmarsilio@iseg.utl.pt 
2 R. Carande, Los caminos del oro y de la plata. Deuda exterior y tesoros ultramarinos, Madrid, 1967. 
3 H. Chaunu – P. Chaunu, Séville et l’Atlantique, 1504-1650, 8 vols., Paris, 1955-1959. 
4 A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Los caudales de Indias y la política exterior de Felipe IV’, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 13 
(1956), pp. 311-383; A. Domínguez Ortiz ‘Las remesas de metales preciosos de Indias de 1621 a 1665’, Anuario de 
Historia Económica y Social, 2 (1969), pp. 562-585. 
5 C. Bancora Cañero, ‘Las remesas de metales preciosos desde El Callao a España en la primera mitad del siglo XVII’, 
Revista de Indias, 75 (1959), pp. 35-88. 
6 M. E. Rodríguez Vicente, ‘Los caudales remitidos desde el Perú a España por cuenta de la Real Hacienda. Series 
estadísticas (1651-1739)’, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 21 (1964), pp. 1-24. 
7 A. García-Baquero González, Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717-1778), 2 vols., Sevilla, 1976 and the most recent article: 
‘American gold and silver in the Eighteenth Century: From Fascination to Accounting’, in D. O. Flynn – A. Giráldez – 
R. von Glahn (eds.), Global connections and monetary history, 1470-1800, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 107-121. 
8 C. P. Kindleberger, Spenders and Hoarders: The World Distribution of Spanish American Silver, 1550-1750, Singapore, 
1989. 
9 R. Romano, Opposte congiunture. La crisi del Seicento in Europa e in America, Venezia, 1992. 
10 C. Álvarez Nogal, El crédito de la Monarquía Hispánica durante el reinado de Felipe IV, Valladolid, 1997. 
11 A. M. Bernal, España, proyecto inacabado: costes/beneficios del Imperio, Madrid, 2005. 
12 B. Yun Casalilla, Marte contra Minerva. El precio del Imperio español (c. 1450-1600), Barcelona, 2004. 
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Rahn Phillips13. However, it was the research of Hamilton14 which provided the most reliable estimate 
on the shipment of white metal from the New World; in fact his data is still today the starting point for 
every study of a quantitative nature.  The most prominently critical contributions in relation to the 
data collected by Hamilton are certainly the works of Michel Morineau15. The estimates proposed by 
the French historian, relating to the quantity of silver sent to Europe in the Seventeenth century are 
notably higher than those presented by Hamilton in the 1930s. 
The classic historiography has often revealed the relevant role played by precious metals as a 
means of payment to allow the European continent to gain access to the spices and other goods 
from the Asian market.  As Braudel has shown, it was the trade in spices that constituted the 
decisive push towards International integration in the modern age.  This articulated process, defined 
as the “circulatory System of the World Economy”16, sees Europe as the main purchaser of Asian 
spices, and the silver extracted from the American mines as the form of international payment.  
Asian countries, in primis India, beyond China and Japan, received huge amounts of precious metal 
for exotic products (not only spices), in which the European market was increasingly interested.  
Silver moved from west to east with a constant and regular flow, counter balanced in the opposite 
direction by every type of rare and exotic produce.  Also, the arrivals of precious metals influenced 
the monetary circuits altering the balance of the economies of Europe, changing in particular the 
levels of prices which, particularly in the Seventeenth century, grew dangerously.  The noted “price 
revolution”17 is not the subject of this work, although it is fundamental to analyse and understand how 
the silver was inserted into the financial circuits not only of Europe, but also internationally. 
We recall that the Spanish Empire itself benefited in large part from the silver of its colonies.  
Indeed, the classic historiography is interested in the silver trade in relation to both the public debt of 
the Iberian crown18 (of which the asientos are an example), and the credit market, as well as the 
________________________ 
13 C. Rahn Phillips, ‘The Growth and composition of Trade in the Imperial Empires 1450-1750’, in J. Tracy (ed.), The 
Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 34-101. 
14 The most relevant works of E. J. Hamilton are the articles: ‘Imports of American Gold and Silver Into Spain, 1503-
1660’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 43/3 (May, 1929), pp. 436-472; ‘American Treasure and the Rise of 
Capitalism (1500-1700)’, Economica, 9 (Nov. 1929), pp. 338-357. His most important books are: American 
Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain 1501-1650, Cambridge (Mass.), 1934 and War and Prices in Spain, 
1651-1800, Cambridge (Mass.), 1947. 
15 M. Morineau, ‘Gazettes hollandaises et trésors américains’, Anuario de Historia Económica e Social, 2 (1969), pp. 289-
363; 3 (1970), pp. 139-211 and his pivotal monograph Incroyables Gazettes et Fabuleux Métaux. Les retours des 
Trésors Américains d’après les Gazettes Hollandaises (XVI-XVIII siècles), Cambridge-Paris, 1985. See also: A. Jara, 
Tres ensayos sobre economía minera hispanoamericana, Santiago de Chile, 1966. 
16 F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol. I, London, 1975, p. 569. 
17 C. P. Kindleberger, Spenders and Hoarders: The World Distribution of Spanish American Silver 1550-1750, Singapore, 
1989. Critically commented on by D. O. Flynn in his review of the book in Journal of Economic History, 50/3 (1990), 
pp 721-724. See also: J. de Vries, ‘Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape-route Trade, 
1497-179', in D. O. Flynn – A. Giráldez – R. von Glahn (eds.), Global connections and monetary history, 1470-1800, 
Aldershot, 2003, pp. 35-105. 
18 For the reign of Philip IV see: A. Domínguez Ortiz, Política y hacienda de Felipe IV, Madrid 1983; C. Álvarez Nogal, 
Los banqueros de Felipe IV y los metales preciosos americanos (1621-1665), Madrid 1997; C. Álvarez Nogal, El 
crédito de la Monarquía Hispánica durante el reinado de Felipe IV, Valladolid 1999, C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘The Role 
Played by Short-Term Credit in the Spanish Monarchy’s Finances’, in F. Piola Caselli (ed.), Government Debts and 
Financial Markets in Europe, London, 2008, pp. .81-97. 
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system of international payments19 (in particular the exchange fairs20). We are missing however an in-
depth examination that concentrates on the role of the mints both as active “clients” in the silver 
trade and as mediators used by the financial operators. This would allow us to understand how and 
to what extent the silver managed by the financial operators of Europe could have had a significant 
impact on the supply of currency in some “national” markets. 
Therefore, the objective of this article is to place in relation to one another the links that 
existed during the reign of Philip IV (1621-1665) between the silver used in the asientos (the loans 
made to the Spanish crown by foreign bankers) and the activity of some of the European mints. The 
question that I am raising is whether the European mints were “good clients” within the silver market 
that originated in the Iberian Peninsula? Why select the years 1621-1650 within the reign of Philip 
IV? Because it was right in this period that Portuguese and Genoese bankers were holding control 
over the market of the asientos in Madrid, and consequently the mints of Lisbon and Genoa could 
represent a privileged observation point on the trade in Spanish silver. In addition, in the same years 
new mechanisms of payment of the Spanish troops deployed to Flanders facilitated the emergence 
of a new Atlantic route that favoured the inclusion in this market of the London Mint. In other words, 
to what extent did the precious metal coming from the financial activity of the Portuguese and 
Genoese bankers in Madrid, influence the monetary supply within some European States? 
In order to respond adequately to this question, I have concentrated on the study of the mints 
of Genoa, Lisbon and London in the period 1621-1650.  Why these mints? Because the presumption 
is that the Genoese and Portuguese mints were directly linked to the interests of the banqueros of 
Madrid, whilst that of London had a strong link with the Spanish silver market, a fact that is proven in 
particular by a reading of the papers in the Archivo General de Simancas. Indeed, as will be seen, 
the credit system activated by the payment of the Spanish troops involved in the interminable 
military campaign in Flanders (1568-1648), shows how the asientos influenced the activity and the 
levels of production of the mints examined here. In addition, it will also be revealed how the logistics 
of the International payments system were remodelled in order to transform the Atlantic route into an 
essential instrument for the financial and credit activity of the bankers of Madrid, so as to transform 
the London market into a new centre for the distribution of silver. If this hypothesis is confirmed, we 
can then observe the competition between these three mints in the European silver market, as well 
as calculate an estimate of the amount of silver coming from the Spanish asientos acquired by these 
monetary shops with the aim of satisfying their own demand for national currency. 
The first part of this essay is dedicated to the presentation of important historiographical 
debate about the production of American precious metals in the Sixteenth-Seventeenth centuries, 
________________________ 
19 For a general analysis of the financial market of Early Modern Europe see L. Neal, ‘How it all began: the monetary and 
financial architecture of Europe during the first global capital markets, 1648–1815’, Financial History Review, 7/2 
(2000), pp. 117-140. 
20 On the Italian exchange fairs see: Silva, J. G. da, Banque et crédit e Italie au XVIIe siècle, Paris, 1969. For an up to date 
bibliography see: C. Marsilio, Dove il denaro fa denaro. Gli operatori finanziari genovesi nelle fiere di cambio del XVII 
secolo, Novi Ligure, 2008. 
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because it is important to tackle it and establish its relevance in relation to the levels of production by 
the mints. 
The second part of the work intends to analyse the asientos during the reign of Philip IV 
(1621-1665) in order to see if there exists a correlation between the silver obtained in 
reimbursement from the court bankers, the Portuguese and Genoese hombres de negocios, and the 
successive distribution of precious metal in different European monetary circuits studied through the 
production cycles of the mints of Genoa, Lisbon and London. 
The third part of the article aims to underline how the financial circuits generated by the 
asientos influenced the levels of production of the mints studied here, revealing both the growing 
participation of the Lusitanian bankers in the market of the asientos, and the preponderant role of 
the Royal Navy in the organisation of the logistics and transport of Spanish precious metal.  It is 
logical to suppose that there is a link between the production levels of the mints selected and the 
volumes of precious metal covered by the loan contracts granted to the Spanish crown. 
In conclusion, not all the mints observed were affected as the same level by the financial 
activity of the Genoese and Portuguese banqueros.  Unexpectedly, the levels of production of the 
Casa da Moeda of Lisbon points to poor arrivals of silver linked to the asientos in Madrid, whilst the 
mints in Genoa and London were more conditioned by the mechanisms of the financial market 
managed in those years by the financiers of Philip IV. 
 
 
2. The production of American precious metals: historical point of view 
 
The shipments from America, as has already been mentioned, have been at the centre of a 
long and heated debate which still today has not been concluded by definitive and certain results.  
After the first works of the Nineteenth century, amongst which it is worthwhile mentioning the 
contributions of W. Jacob21 as well as the investigation subsequently conducted by A. Soetbeer22, 
the most thorough research of the first years of the century is that of A. Von Humbolt23 whose 
estimates for the Seventeenth century are presented here: 
 
                                            
________________________ 
21 W. Jacob, An historical inquiry into the production and consumption of the precious metals, London, 1831. 
22 A. Soetbeer, Edelmetall-Produktion und Wertverhältnisse zwischen Gold und Silber seit der Entdeckung Amerikas, 
Gotha, 1879. 
23 A. von Humbolt, Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain, 4 vols., London, 1811. 
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                                   Table 1 - American silver production (1601-1700)  
                     Source: A. von Humbolt, Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain (republished  
                                  In W. Barrett, ʻWorld Bullion flows, 1450-1800ʼ cit., pp. 242-243). 
 
As can be observed in Table 1, if we consider the period 1601-1650, the production of the 
American mines is estimated at a little more than 18,000 tons24, despite not providing any estimate 
for the amount of silver that arrived into the ports of Europe. However, research has been conducted 
by Earl J. Hamilton25 which has supplied more reliable estimates on the shipments of white metal 
from the New World, which today still represents the starting point for every study of a quantitative 
nature regarding the arrivals of precious metals in Europe.  From the table which follows we can see 
that the American historian estimated the arrivals of silver into the port of Seville at 9,500 tons in the 
first half of the Seventeenth century (1600-1660), the port at which the Iberian crown recorded the 
goods arriving from the American colonies.  
 
           Table 2 – Hamilton: Arrivals of silver into Europe from America (1600-1660) 








Source: E. J. Hamilton, El Tesoro Americano y la revolución de los precios en España, 1501-1650,         
Barcelona, 1975, p. 47 (conversion from silver pesos of 450 maravedis into kg.). 
 
________________________ 
24 Another document that is very interesting from a quantative point of view is that prepared in 1930 by Merrill for the 
government of the United States. See: C. W. Merrill et al., Summarized Data of Silver Production, Washington, U. S. 
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Mines, Economic Paper, 8 (1930). 
25 See note 13. 
Periods Average Annual Production (Kg.) 
Total Production 
(Kg. )  
1601-1625 340.000 8.500. 0 0 0  
1626-1650 395.000 9.875. 0 0 0  
1651-1675 445.000 11.125.000  
1676-1700 500.000 12.500.000  
Total  42.000.000  
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Ward Barrett, in a recent study26, has also verified and recalculated the value proposed by 
Morineau which has been gathered together here in the following table: 
 








1601-1625 245.000 6.125.000	  
1626-1650 290.000 7.250.000	  
1651-1675 330.000 8.250.000	  
1676-1700 370.000 9.250.000	  
       Total  30.875.000	  
                      Source: W. Barrett, ‘World Bullion flows, 1450-1800’ cit., pp. 242-243. 
An example of the recent effort to interpret this complex historiographical theme has been 
supplied by the recent works of D. A. Brading and H. E. Cross27, P. J. Bakewell28, H. S. Klein29, J. J. 
Tepaske30, D. O. Flynn31, and A. Giráldez32. However, without doubt the most solid and stimulating 
contribution to the criticism of Hamiltonʼs data has been the research on mining production in Peru 
and Mexico by Brading and Cross33. In 1983 Cross34 further refined his quantitative analysis, 
showing that the values of production of the South American mines, in particular that of the 
Viceroyalty of Peru, are greater than Hamiltonʼs estimates.  As a result it has become evident that if 
we add to the production of Peru the silver extracted from the Mexican mines, that the values greatly 
exceed the estimates provided by Hamilton. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that the 
figures presented by the American historian in relation to the arrivals of precious metals into Europe, 
not only underestimate the arrivals into the European ports, but also give a distorted view of the 
same mining production of the New World35. It should be observed that the differences in values 
presented by the two authors relate to the reign of Philip IV (1621-1665), the same period covered 
by our analysis. 
________________________ 
26 W. Barrett, ‘World Bullion flows, 1450-1800’, in J. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade 
in Early Modern World 1350-1750, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 224-254. 
27 D. A. Brading - H. E. Cross, 'Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico e Peru', Hispanic American Historical Review, 52/4 
(1972), pp. 545-579. 
28 P. J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546-1700, Cambridge, 1971. 
29 J. J. Tepaske – H. S. Klein, ‘The Seventeenth Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?’, Past & Present, 90 
(1981), pp. 116-135. 
30 Applies to all: J. J. Tepaske, ‘New World silver, Castile and the Philippines, 1590-1800’, in J. F. Richards, Precious 
Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, Durham (N. C.), 1983, pp. 425-445. 
31 D. O. Flynn, World Silver and Monetary History in the16th and 17th Centuries, Aldershot, 1996. 
32 D. O. Flynn – A. Giráldez – R. von Glahn (eds.), Global connections and monetary history, 1470-1800, Aldershot, 
2003. 
33 D. A. Brading - H. E. Cross, 'Colonial Silver Mining’ cit. 
34 H. E. Cross, ‘South American Bullion production and export 1550-1750’, in J. F. Richards, Precious Metals in the 
Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, Durham (N. C.), 1983, pp. 397-423. 
35 H. E. Cross, 'Colonial Silver Mining’ cit., pp.417-419. 




                     Table 4 – Hamilton vs. Cross: Registered import of bullion into Seville from America     









silver outputs (kg.)  
1621–1630 2.194.720 2.472.888 
1631–1640 1.411.256 2.383.568 
1641–1650 1.076.944 2.107.952 
1651–1660 449.152 1.612.864 
Total 5.132.072 8.577.272 
Source: H. E. Cross, ‘South American Bullion production and export 1550-1750’ cit., p. 419 
 
The evident difference between the values of the two estimates shown here raises another 
question about the redistribution of the American silver: how much precious metal was used in 
Europe and how much was sent outside of Europe? J. de Vries, in his recent work, has 
reconstructed the articulated network of distribution of silver37. For the period 1600-1650, the Dutch 
historian has presented a picture that brings together the different areas of production and 
distribution of precious metal.  In synthesis, he calculates that the average annual production of the 
American mines was 368 tons (18,400 tons over the 50 years studied), of which 268 tons reached 
the continent of Europe.  Europe then held back about 160 tons, while it sent 56 tons to the Baltic 
region, 38 tons to the Middle East via the sea and about 14 tons to the Asian continent (particularly 
to the area of the south-orient) through the route of the Cape of Good Hope. In his article de Vries 
has underlined the role, which has still not been sufficiently examined in the classic historiography, 
of the Cape of Good Hope38. 
In the end, with regard to the first fifty years of the Seventeenth century, de Vries has 
underlined the importance of Japan as a significant producer of white metal, the relevance of which 
has often been underestimated, and of the Phillipines to which was sent a consistent part of the 
American production.  He has calculated that there was perhaps 60 tons of silver sent from Japan to 
south-east Asia on average per year. The arrival of silver in Manila poses a problem of 
interpretation: TePaske39 calculates a figure of 17 tons a year, while Flynn and Giráldez40 propose 
more than 52 tons a year.  It seems plausible that this was followed by a reduction in the arrivals into 
Manila which might not take into account smuggling which was an endemic problem, as in the case 
________________________ 
36 1 real de a ocho = 0.02552 kg. (silver). 
37 J. de Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape-route Trade, 1497-179” cit., especially 
pp. 80-82. 
38 Some interesting observations also in: J. de Vries, ‘The limits of globalization in the Early Modern World’, Economic 
History Review, 63/3 (2010), pp. 710-733. 
39 J. J. TePaske, ‘New World silver’ cit., pp. 444-445. 
40 D. O. Flynn – A. Giráldez, ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”: The Origin of World Trade in 1571’, Journal of World 
History, 6/2 (1995), pp. 201-221, especially pp. 202-204. 
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of Atlantic trade, which seems to have grown substantially in those very years41. In addition, Borah42 
and Boxer43 have underlined that the Pacific route towards Manila was perhaps used not only for 
sending silver from Mexico, but also for that coming from Peru. Flynn has noted several times the 
importance of this second maritime route, as well as the almost total lack of quantitative studies that 
can help us to better understand the Asian monetary market44. 
In the case of India, the collection of essays edited by J. F. Richards45 dedicated to the 
financial system of the Mughal Empire has provided an ample analysis of the impact of silver on the 
financial system and the mechanisms of International payments in the area of the Indian Ocean.  
Undoubtedly, most of the imports to India from Europe were of precious metals, in primis silver.  In 
summary, according to the calculations of de Vries, in the first half of the Seventeenth century there 
arrived in Europe 13,400 tons of silver, of which only 60 per cent (8,000 tons) stayed in Europe 
whilst the rest was sent to other continents. 
 
    Table 5 - J. de Vries: Silver arrived in Europe and sent outside Europe (1600-1650) 
 
 






Silver used in Europe 160 8.000 
Silver sent to Baltic Sea 56 2.800 
Silver sent to Near East (Via        
Mediterranean Sea) 
38 1.900 
Silver sent to Asia (via Cape   
Town Route) 
14 700 
Total (silver arrived in Europe) 268 13.400 
Source: J. de Vries, ‘Connecting Europe and Asia’ cit., pp. 80-82. 
________________________ 
41 See also: R. von Glahn, ‘Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500-1800’, 
in D. O. Flynn – A. Giráldez – R. von Glahn (eds.), Global connections and monetary history, 1470-1800, Aldershot, 
2003, pp. 187-205; R. von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700, Berkeley 
(Cal.), 1996; W. S. Atwell, ‘International Bullion Flow and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650’, Past & Present, 95 
(1982), pp. 68-90 and W. S. Atwell, ‘Some Observations on the “Seventeenth-Century Crisis” in China and Japan’, 
Journal of Asian Studies, 45/2 (1986), pp. 223-244. 
42 C. R. Borah, Early Colonial Trade and Navigation between Mexico and Peru, Berkeley - Los Angeles, 1954, pp. 115-
127. 
43 C. R. Boxer, ‘Plata es sangre: Sidelights on the Drain of Spanish-American Silver in the Far East, 1500-1700‘, 
Philippine Studies, 18 (1970), pp. 457-478. 
44 D. O. Flynn, ‘Comparing the Tokagawa Shogunate with Hapsburg Spain. Two silver-based empires in a global setting’, 
in E. H. G. van Cauwenberghe (ed.), Money, Coins, and Commerce: Essays in the Monetary History of Asia and Europe 
(From Antiquity to Modern Times), Leuven, 1991, pp. 11-46, especially pp. 12-13. 
45 F. Perlin, ‘Money-Use in Late Pre-Colonial India and the International Trade in currency media’, in J. F. Richards (ed.), 
The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India, Delhi, 1987, pp. 232-373, O. Prakash, ‘Foreign Merchants and Indian 
Mints in the Seventeenth and the Early Eighteenth Century’, in J. F. Richards (ed.), The Imperial Monetary System of 
Mughal India, Delhi, 1987, pp. 171-192. S. Subrahmanyam, ‘Precious Metal Flow and Prices in Western and Southern 
Asia, 1500-1750. Some Comparative and Conjunctural Aspects’, in E. H. G. van Cauwenberghe (ed.), Money, Coins, 
and Commerce: Essays in the Monetary History of Asia and Europe (From Antiquity to Modern Times), Leuven, 1991, 
pp. 385-418. 
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In order to understand fully the impact of the arrivals of precious metals on the European 
economy in the Seventeenth century it is very important to verify the amount of silver registered by 
the Spanish authority, in order to be able to assess the actual resources available to the treasury in 
Madrid. The recent work of Álvarez Nogal analyses in detail the arrival of precious metals to the 
Iberian Peninsula46. In particular, thanks to new archival research, the quantity of silver that actually 
arrived in Spain has been calculated, which the Spanish scholar has subdivided into that destined 
for the cash registers of the Hapsburg crown and that which was the property of private operators 
(particulares).  For the period of the reign of Phillip IV, the figures of Álvarez Nogal have come close 
to those proposed more than eighty years ago by Hamilton. Particular attention has been paid to the 
subdivision between the quantity of silver unloaded in Seville and Cadiz destined for the cash 
registers of the treasury and that belonging to the private financial operators. The merchants of the 
Iberian Peninsula received the shipments from the American correspondents who often, at least in 
these years, exceeded the quantity of silver available to the Hacienda Real in Madrid. 
 
  Table 6 – Arrivals of silver into Spain (1621-1665): Private stock (particulares) vs. Public stock         
                 (king) in kg 
 
Periods "King’s silver" (kg.) 
"Particulares’ 
silver" (kg.) 
Total Silver arrived in 
Spain (Kg.) 
1621-25 237.337 1.005.673 1.243.010 
1626-30 205.486 852.584 1.058.070 
1631-35 216.598 514.152 730.750 
1636-40 294.958 347.735 642.693 
1641-45 289.297 275.465 564.762 
1646-50 135.389 385.706 521.095 
1651-55 133.903 179.491 313.395 
1656-60 81.011 84.570 165.581 
1661-65 76.069 111.040 187.108 
Total 1.670.048 3.756.415 5.426.463 
Source: C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘Las Remesas americanas en las finanzas de la Real Hacienda’ cit., pp. 485-488. 
 
 
                      
________________________ 
46 C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘Las Remesas americanas en las finanzas de la Real Hacienda. La cuantificación del dinero de la 
Corona (1621-1675)’, Revista de Historia Económica, 16/2 (1998), pp. 453-488. 
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                     Chart 1 – Arrivals of Silver (in kg.) into Spain (1621-1665): Private stock (particulares)      
                                    vs. Public stock (king) 
 
Source: C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘Las Remesas americanas en las finanzas de la Real Hacienda’ cit., pp. 485-
488. 
This division between the silver of the king and that of private operators turns out to be 
fundamental for the period in which we assess the actual resources available to the Hapsburg 
crown47.  In this article we take this value as a reference point from which we can calculate the silver 
that arrived in the Iberian Peninsula, the 5,426 tons proposed by Álvarez Nogal. 
The only way to finance the huge costs was therefore to borrow money through the 
asentistas, in order to have each year huge tax advances. We must not forget that one of the more 
delicate and expensive aspects of the managing the payment of the Spanish troops who had been 
engaged in war since the 1580s, was certainly the management of precious metals and various 
kinds of coins destined for the wages of the military48. Until the 1620s only gold coins were accepted 
into the military cash register of Brussels. But with the passing of time, the growing rarity of yellow 
metal brought a radical change in the management of the cash registers of the army of Flanders: the 
gold coins were gradually substituted with coins of white metal, to the extent that the administration 
in Madrid and its collaborators, the Portuguese and Genoese bankers found it much easier, more 
economical and more practical to manage the payment of the troops in silver money.  
________________________ 
47 For a detailed analysis of the costs of the Spanish Empire see: A. M. Bernal, España, proyecto inacabado: 
costes/beneficios del Imperio, Madrid, 2005 e B. Yun Casalilla, Marte contra Minerva. El precio del Imperio español 
(c. 1450-1600), Barcelona, 2004. 
48 G. Parker, ‘Spain, her Enemies, and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559-1648’, Past and Present, 49 (1970), pp. 72-95. 
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From as early as 1619 the expenses incurred by Philip III began to grow at an alarming rate, 
to the point that the costs incurred by the new king Philip IV had doubled by 1642 from what they 
were in 1621 at the start of his reign49.  The main cause of the unexpected soaring in costs was the 
dispute with France, which since 1635 committed the Castilian troops on a new front. A substantial 
reduction in costs was recorded only in 1643 when the by now deposed first minister Olivares, 




3. The asientos of Phillip IV: precious metals and loans from court bankers 
 
 The asiento can be defined as a contract between a private individual and the Spanish 
crown.  Normally the object of the agreement52 was a loan of money, a service or a special licence53.  
In the asiento both the conditions offered by the bankers for the delivery of money (quantity, type of 
currency, delivery location), and the means of reimbursement which the crown was bound to 
respect, were fixed.  Within each asiento various operations could be distinguished: the loan itself, 
the costs of transport and of managing the money, as well those costs inherent to the act of 
exchange between various European currencies. In addition, especially from the 1630s, another 
important part of the cost was the silver/bullion exchange54, which was the subject - particularly in 
Spain - of a running debate throughout the middle decades of the Seventeenth century. These 
contractual clauses also included the adehalas, the true and proper benefits which in many cases 
constituted the most profitable part (together with the exchanges) of the asiento. But what 
guarantees did the hombres de negocios receive for their loans? First of all they fixed the 
consignaciones that is the supplementary guarantees offered to the creditors of the crown made up 
from the revenue of the Hacienda Real. This income was subsequently liquidated through the 
various tesorerías of the Hacienda Real spread across the entire territory of the Iberian Peninsula.  
The capitals that were newly available to the foreign bankers could therefore be exported outside of 
________________________ 
49 A. Marcos Martín, ‘La Spagna e le Fiandre (1618-1648)’ cit., pp. 25-26. 
50 For a total picture of the political and economic situation of Spanish Flanders in the seventeenth century see: M. Á. 
Echevarría Bacigalupe, Flandes y la monarquía hispánica, 1500-1713, Madrid, 1998 and J. Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de 
Llano., España, Flandes y Mar del Norte (1618-1639). La última ofensiva europea de los Austrias madrileños, Madrid, 
1975. 
51 See the classic study: J. H. Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares. El político en la época de decadencia, Barcelona, 1990. 
52 For a precise description of the series of contracts kept in the l’Archivo General de Simancas see A. Marcos Martín, 
España y Flandes (1618-1648): la financiación de la guerra, in J. Alcalá Zamora – E. Beleguer (eds.), Calderón de la 
Barca y la España del Barroco, II, Madrid, 2001, pp. 15-40, now also in A. Marcos Martín, Finanze e fiscalità regia 
nella Castiglia di antico regime (secc. XVI-XVII), Galatina, 2010, pp. 15-40.  The contracts can be found in Archivo 
General de Simancas (AGS), Contadurías Generales, legajos (legs.), 113-142. 
53 For a detailed description of the various clauses contained in a asiento see: J. M. González Ferrando, Negociación de 
cambios y asientos. Un opúsculo de autor anónimo sobre asientos, cambios y contabilidad por partida doble, de finales 
del primer tercio del siglo XVII, Madrid, 1993. 
54 Small denomination coins made up of an alloy of silver and cooper. 
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Spain. It should be underlined that until 1566 the export of precious metals was absolutely 
prohibited, and for this reason the asentistas were constrained to spend their credit in goods 
(particularly in food products) or to negotiate letters of exchange at the Castilian trade fair at Medina 
del Campo55. Only later would there be included in the contract the right to export precious metals 
(licencia de saca), which would allow the bankers of the crown to manage freely the silver obtained 
in payment from the Hacienda Real. All of this allows us to hypothesise with greater conviction that a 
part of the silver negotiated in the contracts of the asientos could have been acquired by mints 
outside of Spain. 
In order to understand fully the financial power of the Portuguese and Genoese banqueros 
during the reign of Phillip IV it is necessary to analyse from a comparative point of view the data that 
we have. The Ligurian bankers occupied an elevated position until the end of the 1620s, when their 
Lusitanian colleagues56 (from 1626) were affirmed as the leaders of the Spanish credit market until 
the end of the 1640s57. In particular, we have chosen to use the series presented by Alberto Marcos 
Martín58, because it is considered to be the most complete and reliable59. He has elaborated on two 
series of data: the total quantity of money leant by the banqueros, destined to cover various 
expenses, and the asientos, destined specifically for Flanders60. For example, in 1627 (year of the 
first insolvency, or quiebra) of Phillip IV, Marcos Martín has shown that the most relevant part of the 
shipments to Brussels and Antwerp were sustained by the Ligurian hombres de negocios (53%) and 
that, in the following year a pool of four Genoese bankers guaranteed to the crown almost 68% of 
loans61. However, in the five years from 1636-1640 the Portuguese asientos62 made up more than 
42% of the money given in loan to the crown as opposed to 34% from the Genoese. But it was in the 
________________________ 
55 F. Ruiz Martín, ‘La Banca de España hasta 1782’, in F. Ruiz Martín (ed.), El Banco de España: una historia 
económica, Madrid 1970, pp. 1-196, H. Casado Alonso, ‘Comercio, crédito y finanzas públicas en Castilla en la época 
de los Reyes Católicos’, in Bernal Rodríguez (ed.), Dinero, moneda y crédito en la monarquía hispánica, Madrid, 2000, 
pp. 135 – 156 and H. Casado Alonso, ‘Medina del Campo Fairs and The Integration of Castile into 15th to 16th Century 
European Economy’, in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), Fiere e Mercati nella Integrazione delle Economie Europee. Secc. XIII – 
XVIII. Firenze, 2001, pp. 495 – 517. 
56 The first Portuguese asentistas (1626-1636) were: Manuel Rodriguez de Elvas, Duarte Fernández, Manuel de Paz, 
Simáo Soares, Juan Núñez Sarabia, Simón & Lorenzo Pereira, Simón Suárez Dorta, and Nuño Díaz Méndez Brito. 
During the following years (1636-1647) many others were added to the list of the banqueros de la Corona: Marcos 
Fernández Monsanto, García de Yllán, Jorge de Paz Silveira, Felipe Martínez Dorta, Duarte Brandão Soares, Fernandes 
Tinoco, Salvador Báez Martínez, Antonio Báez de Guzmán, Duarte Díaz de Olivares, Andrés Gomez Dávila, Juan de 
Silva Lisboa, Manuel Cortizos, and Felipe Denis Pacheco y Medina. 
57 A. Dominguez Ortiz, Política y hacienda cit.; J.C. Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650, New 
Brunswick (N. J.), 1983; F. Ruiz Martín, Las finanzas de la monarquía hispánica en tiempos de Felipe IV (1621-1665), 
Madrid, 1990, E. Neri, Uomini d’affari e di governo tra Genova e Madrid (secoli XVI e XVII), Milano, 1989 and E. 
Grendi, I Balbi. Una famiglia genovese fra Spagna e Impero, Torino, 1997 
58 A. Marcos Martín, ‘La Spagna e le Fiandre’ cit., pp. 15-40. 
59 See the collection of asientos in the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Contadurías Generales, legajos 121-123. 
60 P. Chaunu, ‘Séville et la Belgique, 1555-1648’, Revue du Nord, 42 (1960), pp. 259-292; G. Parker, The Logistics of 
Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars, Cambridge, 1972. 
61 The principal borrowers were: Ottavio Centurione, Stefano Spinola, Vincenzo Squarciafico and Antonio Balbi. See A. 
Marcos Martín, ‘La Spagna e le Fiandre’ cit., pp. 36-37. 
62 On the Portuguese bankers see: J. C. Boyajian, The Portuguese Bankers and the International Payments Mechanism, 
1626-1647, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkley, 1978; N. Bröens, Monarquía y capital mercantil: 
Felipe IV y las redes comerciales portuguesas (1627-35), Madrid, 1989 and M. A. Ebben, Zilver, brood en kogels voor 
de Koning. Kredietverlening door Portugese bankiers aan de Spaanse Kron, 1621-1665, Leiden, 1996. 
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period 1641-1645 that the greatest exposure ever achieved by conversos bankers was registered 
(61%), while in 1647 (year of the second quiebra during the reign of Philip IV), this percentage 
dropped to 43%, before stabilising at about 29% in the following year. The net recovery of the 
Genoese is evident in the two year period of 1646-1648 with the signing of the asiento by the 
brothers Francesco Maria and Andrea Pichenotti in partnership with Alessandro Pallavicini63. 
 
                                Chart 2 – Genoese and Portuguese asientos for Flanders (1621-1648) 
 
Sources: A. Marcos Martín, ‘‘España y Flandes (1618-1648): la financiación de la guerra’’ cit., in Alcalá 
Zamora, J. and Belenguer E. (eds.), Calderón de la Barca y la España del Barroco, vol. II, Madrid, 2001, pp. 
20; e 36. 
However, let us take a step back and compare the values of silver arriving from the South 
American mines proposed by Álvarez Nogal (see Chart 1) with the amounts negotiated by the 
Iberian crown. 
It is fundamental to note that in the period 1626-1630 the quantity of silver arriving from the 
colonies into Seville, including the part destined for private operators, did not reach even a fifth of 
that negotiated by the Hacienda of Madrid with the foreign bankers to support the war against the 
United Provinces. For the next five years, 1631-1635, the proportion actually grew by more than a 
tenth, while for the years 1641-1645 it was exceeded by a sixteenth. Therefore, one can affirm that 
the level of debt of the Hapsburgs was notably greater than the value of silver extracted from the 
colonies.  However, by observing carefully the data for the arrivals from America and comparing 
________________________ 
63 A. Marcos Martín, ‘La Spagna e le Fiandre’ cit., p. 33; C. Álvarez Nogal, Los banqueros de Felipe IV cit., C. Sanz 
Ayán, ‘Presencia y fortuna de los hombres de negocios genoveses durante la crisis hispana de 1640’, Hispania, 65 
(2005), pp. 91-114. 
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them with the estimates proposed by Morineau and de Vries we can see a clear discrepancy. What 
can we deduce from this? It is possible to present some considerations. Perhaps the values in the 
official records of the Spanish Casa de la Contratación, studied by Hamilton and Álvarez Nogal, 
underestimated the actual arrivals of precious metal into the European continent? This would 
suggest a widespread and deep-rooted activity of smuggling throughout the Seventeenth century, 
which would bring us closer to the estimates of de Vries and Morineau for the values of the asientos 
of the Spanish crown. 
Another important step is to try to establish a percentage proportion between the silver 
retained in Europe and the values of the asientos contracted by the Hacienda Real in Madrid that 
were useful for meeting the costs in Flanders. If we consider the period 1621-1648, the Portuguese 
and Genoese bankers granted loans of a value equal to 37,095 tons of silver. Based on the 
estimates of de Vries who calculates that from 1600-1650, on average 160 tons were retained in 
Europe per year, over the course of twenty-seven years we reach an amount equal to 4,320 tons.  
We can deduce therefore that in the period 1621-1647 the silver retained in Europe represented only 
11.65% of the value, expressed in silver, of the loans granted to the crown of Philip IV.   
It is also important to remember the chronology of European history: the continent had been 
devastated by the Thirty Yearsʼ War (1618-1648), a struggle that involved the armies of Madrid on 
many fronts which required a considerable economic effort. The costs sustained by the Hapsburg 
crown, in the interminable Eighty Yearsʼ war against the rebellion of the United Provinces, also 
influenced the market in precious metals. In fact, because the network used by the economic 
operators for the redistribution of Spanish silver had to be based on a new route, the silver needed 
to pay the troops was transported to Flanders thanks to the intervention of the English Royal Navy. 
This new mechanism of distribution was made possible by the peace of 1630 between the 
Hapsburgs and the Stuarts, and this same maritime route was further exploited by the Lusitanian 
financial operators after the declaration of independence from Spain in 1640. Looking at Chart 2, we 
can clearly see that from 1640 the Portuguese bankers established themselves in the market of 
loans to the Spanish crown, right at the moment that the London Mint also entered as protagonists in 
the silver trade.  
Therefore, these two dates, 1630 and 1640, must be considered as fundamental for the 
correct interpretation of the mechanisms for the distribution of silver during the first half of the 
Seventeenth century. To sum up, the 1630s record the entrance of the Lusitanian bankers into the 
system of the Spanish asientos and the subsequent opening of a new Atlantic route with its 
epicentre in London, whilst the 1640s saw the growing dominance of the Lusitanian bankers in the 
market of the Castilian public debt even after the end of the Iberian union, proof of the fact that their 
financial activity was not influenced in any way by politics. 
The enormous amount of money related to the loans granted to the Hapsburg crown of Madrid 
was governed by an articulated financial mechanism: the Genoese exchange fairs. This type of 
clearing house ante litteram saw the almost unchallenged control of the Genoese financial operators 
in the period between the second half of the Sixteenth century and the end of the Seventeenth 
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century.  In contrast, for their Lusitanian colleagues, the archival documents do not seem to give 
them a large role.  The court bankers had to guarantee the delivery of capital, at monthly rates, to 
various European cities.  Not only did they have to respect a precise timetable, but they also had to 
conclude various accounting operations necessary for the proper functioning of this complicated 
credit market. Dealing with places that were often very distant from each other and with financial 
areas that were completely autonomous and separate, certainly the most complicated aspect was 
the exchange between the different currencies. The exchange fairs offered an efficient system for 
transferring precious metals all over Europe. At “Bisenzone”64 the Genoese bankers raised money 
for these loans from a variety of sources, reducing the risks of lending and funding the kingʼs long 
term obligations through short term loans65. The main factor behind the Genoese exchange fairs 
was, more than International commerce, the huge volumes of transactions generated by the Spanish 
crownʼs public debt and the financial speculations made by the most influential European financial 
operators (particularly the Genoese and Florentines). The exchange fairs of Novi created an efficient 
financial network under Genoese control and facilitated arbitrage among the other northern Italian 
exchange fairs. In fact, in 1621, the Genoese bankers decided to transfer the seat of the fair to Novi, 
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Genoa. This act marked the beginning of a series of splits 
within the bankers operating in the Italian fairs. In the first decades of the Seventeenth century the 
history of the exchange fairs is characterised by the simultaneous existence of different credit 
markets (Piacenza, Verona and Bolzano). In the case of the European credit market and in 
particular the Spanish asientos, the exchange fairs were not the only means of redistributing silver.  
The classic historiography has not paid sufficient attention to the role of the mints that were directly 
linked to the interests of the bankers of Philip IV.  Therefore, the objective of the next section is to 
examine more deeply the nature of the relationship between the activity of the mints in question and 
the flow of silver generated by the market of the asientos of Madrid. 
 
 
4. The silver of the asientos and the mints of Lisbon, Genoa and London 
 
I propose to observe the effects of the redistribution of silver, measuring the levels of 
production of the mints of Lisbon, Genoa and London. If the initial hypothesis of this essay is correct, 
that is, if there is a direct relationship between the silver generated by the Spanish asientos and the 
activity of some of the European mints, then the levels of production of the mints of Genoa and 
Lisbon must have been conditioned by the participation of the Ligurian and Lusitanian banqueros in 
the loans made to Philip IV. The case of the Royal Mint of London is different, its level of production 
of silver coins, at least in the years 1630-1650, was influenced by the change in the way that 
________________________ 
64 “Bisenzone” is a toponym, from the French town of Besançon where the fairs were celebrated in the sixteenth century, 
and also frequently used in the seventeenth century. 
65 A. Castillo Pintado, ‘Los juros de Castilla. Apogeo y fin de un instrumento de crédito’, Hispania, 23 (1963), pp. 43-70. 
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precious metal was redistributed, linked to the payment of the Spanish troops involved in the battle 
of Flanders. The first proposal of collaboration between the Hapsburg bankers and the English 
crown occurred in 1622 thanks to the mediation of the influential merchant Lionel Cranfield, future 
first Earl of Middlesex66. Although the agreement was never formally concluded, it is likely that some 
shipments of silver in bars were actually made. However, in the final years of the decade, the 
conditions of open hostility between the two countries prevented the agreement from being finalised.  
It was not until the Cottington Agreement of 1630 and the new atmosphere of constructive 
collaboration between the two crowns that we see (already in 1632) a notable growth in the quantity 
of precious metal sent to the London Mint67. The normal route used by the Spanish Hacienda Real 
for sending money to the troops went from the Italian port of Genoa, to Milan, across the Valtellina 
Valley up to the Rhine Valley in Germany, before finally arriving in Brussels, the capital of the 
Spanish Netherlands. The war against France, from 1635, produced a very delicate military 
situation: the French troops, year by year, conquered and closed the most important Alpine passes 
and the “Spanish Road” became vulnerable. Peace with England in 1630 offered the Genoese and 
Portuguese bankers a very profitable alternative: sending silver to the English ports of Dover, 
Plymouth and Portsmouth from the Atlantic Spanish ports of Corunna, San Sebastián and Bilbao68. 
But why not send it directly to Dunkirk or some other secure port on the Flemish coast69? Because, 
in the “Cottington Agreement”, the English Crown obtained a huge amount of silver that was to be 
sent to England in order to supply the Royal Mint in London and to coin new silver coins70. The 
transport of the silver on the Spanish ships would be guaranteed by an armed escort consisting of a 
group of galleons from the English Royal Navy71. In return, the English crown would claim that two 
thirds of the Spanish silver was sent to the Royal Mint in London72. The remaining third was to be 
sent quickly to the Spanish administration of the troops fighting in Flanders.  The precious metal 
bound for the army in Flanders was shipped under guard to the port of Dunkirk without paying tax on 
it, except for the freightage for the carriage. If the Spanish asentistas preferred to use a galleon of 
________________________ 
66 C. E. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 316-317. 
67 Ashton R., The Crown and the money market, 1603-1640, Oxford, 1960, Ashton R., The City and the Court, 1603-
1643, Cambridge, 1979 and Challis, C. E., Currency and the Economy in Tudor and Early Stuart England, London, 
1989. 
68 For the port of Dover see: J. S. Kepler, 'Fiscal Aspects of the English Carrying Trade during the Thirty Yeras’ War', 
Economic History Review, 25/2 (1972), pp. 261-283; J. S. Kepler, The Exchange of Christendom. The international 
entrepôt at Dover, 1622-1651, Leicester, 1976. 
69 Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano J., España, Flandes y Mar del Norte (1618-1639). La última ofensiva europea de los 
Austrias madrileños, Madrid, 1975. 
70 R. Ashton, The Crown and the money market, 1603-1640, Oxford, 1960 and R. Ashton, The City and the Court, 1603-
1643, Cambridge, 1979. 
71 Of course, their principal fear was an attack by the mighty Dutch Navy. 
72 On the English Royal Mint the best work is: C. E. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint cit. See also: J. Craig, The 
Mint. A history of the London Mint from A.D. 287 to 1948, Cambridge, 1953, A. Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling: A 
History of English Money, Oxford, 1963 and J. D. Gould, 'The Royal Mint in the Early Seventeenth Century', 
Economic History Review, 5/2 (1952), pp. 240-248. 
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the Royal Navy then they would have been charged an extra 1%73. The entrepôt of Dover in 
particular, benefited from the English neutrality in the Thirty Yearsʼ War74. In addition, the records of 
the coining of silver at the Royal Mint confirm the massive imports of this precious metal to the 
advantage of the London monetary market75. 
It is also important to remember that after 1638, after the Spanish had lost the town of 
Breisach, that the “Spanish Road” was closed and the “English Road” became vital, but for the 
Spanish bankers the temptation to change path again, easily returning to the old traditional 
“Genoese Road”, must have been very strong. The English Crown, who had guessed what the true 
intentions of the Portuguese and Genoese financiers were, reduced the demand for silver to only a 
third, but imposed a 2% tax on the silver carried by the English vessels. 
 In the case of the Mint of Genoa we must recall that the asientos signed by the Italian 
bankers involved many layers of Ligurian society. The money borrowed to the crown of Madrid came 
from an articulated network of lenders comprising both the most wealthy capitalists of the city, 
representatives of shipping and maritime insurance, as well as modest savers from different social 
strata. The Genoese investors claimed an increasing amount of reimbursements and their agents in 
Madrid had to pay them back in silver (bullion and coins). The precious metal was delivered from the 
principal Spanish ports of the Mediterranean coast (Barcelona, Cartagena, Dénia and Alicante) to 
the port of Genoa. Very often the Genoese bankers used a public armed fleet (“convogli”), which the 
Republic of Genoa sent twice a year to the Iberian ports. In some unusual cases, often linked to war 
or problems in the international credit market, the Genoese operators also used private galleys to 
bring the silver to the shores of Liguria76. Thanks to some recently opened private Genoese 
archives77, some evidence for the important flow of silver towards the Republic of Genoa can be 
found in the historical data on the production of silver coins by its Public Mint.  The data collected by 
Felloni78 and Meroni79 in their seminal works are presented in the following chart: 
________________________ 
73 H. Taylor, ”Trade, Neutrality, and the ‘English Road’, 1630-1642”, Economic History Review, 25/2 (1972), pp. 236-
260. In 1636 this tax reached 1,50% and the bankers quarrelled a lot about this imposition. The mechanisms of this new 
silver trade are clearly explained in a consulta (session of the Spanish State Council) dated 7 December 1637. It was 
stated that ten boxes of silver have been shipped in La Coruña and that “el conde de Oñate y Villamediana” was already 
in the port of Corruna bound to England “en los galeones ingleses”. Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado, 
legajo (leg.) 2052, doc. 316, consulta del Consejo de Estado (Madrid), 07.12.1637. 
74 The brokers trading in silver in London were: John de la Barr, Burlamacchi, Sir William Courteen, Peter and Samuel 
Fortrey, John Massingberd (agent of the East India Company) and Peter Ricaut. 
75 The data for the outputs of the English Royal Mint during the seventeenth century can be found in: N. Mayhew, ‘Silver 
in England (1600-1800): Coinage outputs and bullion exports from the records of the London Tower Mint and the 
London Company of Goldsmiths’, in J. H. Munro (ed.), Money in the Pre-Industrial World: Bullion, debasements and 
coin substitutes, London, 2012, pp. 97-110 and C. E. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint cit. 
76 For the Genoese ‘convoglio system’ see: L. Lo Basso, Uomini da remo. Galee e galeotti del Mediterraneo in età 
moderna, Milano, 2003 and G. Calcagno, ‘La navigazione convogliata a Genova nella seconda metà del Seicento’, 
Miscellanea Storica Ligure, 3/1 (1971), pp. 265-392. For example, a letter from the Corregidor of Cartagena – don 
Francisco Antonio de Alarcón – records the loading onto Genoese galleys of silver illegally exported by many Genoese 
merchants and bankers from the port of Alicante (AGS, Estado, leg. 2066, letter to the State Council – 13 August 1643). 
77 Some Genoese private archives of particular interest: Archivio Sauli, Archivio Durazzo, Archivio Pallavicini (all 
collected in the Archivio Durazzo Giustiniani, Genova). 
78 G. Felloni, ‘Profilo economico delle monete genovesi dal 1139 al 1814’, in G. Pesce G. – Felloni G. (eds.), Le monete 
genovesi: storia, arte ed economia nelle monete di Genova dal 1139 al 1814, Genova, 1975, pp. 191-358. 
             
 
21 
                      Chart 3 –Mint of Genoa (1621-1665): Silver outputs (kg) 
 
 
Sources: G. Felloni, Profilo economico delle monete genovesi, cit. pp. 320-322; U. Meroni, I "Libri delle 
uscite delle monete" della Zecca di Genova, cit., pp. 56-106. 
 
In order to better understand the activity of the Genoese mint in the years 1622-1648, it is 
necessary to subdivide it into three distinct periods. In the period 1622-1625, moment in which the 
Portuguese bankers were absent from the market of the asientos, we observe that the average 
production of silver coins was 71.498 kg, while in the following period (1626-1640), years in which 
there was a growing participation of the Portuguese bankers, the yearly average reduced to 52.294 
kg.  The dominance of the Portuguese operators in the years 1641-1648 is further confirmed by the 
observation of the collapse in the production of the Genoese Mint to 34.617 kg, just as there is also 
a contraction in the Genoese loans in these very same years (see Appendix B).  
 Looking at the data for the production of the Mint in Lisbon, we would expect to see the 
same direct relationship between the money received in repayment by the Genoese bankers and 
their national Mint. This logic is however proven wrong by the data in Chart 4. From an observation 
of the years 1626-1640 we can deduce that the average production of the mint in Lisbon was equal 
to 35.012 kg. 
 
 
79 U. Meroni, I "Libri delle uscite delle monete" della Zecca di Genova, dal 1589 al 1640, Mantova, 1957. 
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Chart 4 - Mint of Lisbon (1607-1665): silver bullion (entradas de prata em barras) vs. silver              
bullion & coins (entradas de prata barras e moedas) in kg. 
 
Sources: Arquivo da Casa da Moeda (Lisboa), Receita e Despesa, livros 862-955 (years 1607-1665); F. 
Mauro, Portugal, o Brasil e o Atlântico (1570-1670), Lisboa, 1989, p. 182. No evidence for the years 1634 and 
1637. No bullion entries for the years 1636 and 1650. 
 
 
The Portuguese Casa da Moeda only partially exploited the participation of the Lusitanian 
banqueros in the asientos of Madrid.  If we examine the series of the silver inputs (“entradas de 
prata em barras” - silver ingots) only for the period 1628-1629 there are recorded copious arrivals of 
silver ingots linked to the financial activity of the conversos in the Spanish capital.  Everything seems 
to suggest that this peak in the deliveries of silver to Lisbon is perhaps linked to the activity of the 
new Portuguese India Company, which in these very years was accumulating capital to organise 
their Asian business80. In particular, the average for the years 1630-1640 fell to 20.013 kg, only to fall 
again to 4.269 kg in the 1640s (1641-1648). This suggests that the Forties, in as far as it coincides 
with the period of greatest involvement of the Portuguese bankers in the Spanish public debt, did not 
record large arrivals of silver in bars (ingots) in Lisbon, but, as Chart 4 shows, the main part of the 
production depended on the massive operation of melting and re-coining the Spanish silver money 
that was still legally in circulation in the Portuguese monetary circuit even after the Restauração of 
1640.  There is no need either to forget that Spanish silver was the main commodity for exchange in 
the trade of slaves from South America, in which the Portuguese were the undisputed leaders until 
________________________ 
80 On the new Portuguese India Company see: A. R. Disney, ‘The First Portuguese India Company, 1628-1633’, 
Economic History Review, 30/2 (1977), pp. 242-258; A. R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in 
Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, 1978, pp. 71-148; C. R. Silva, ‘The Portuguese East 
India Company 1628-1633’, Luso-Brazilian Review, 11/2 (1974), pp. 152-205; E. de Sousa Barros, Negócios de Tanta 
Importância: O Conselho Ultramarino e a Disputa pela Condução da Guerra no Atlântico e no Índico (1643-1661). 
Lisboa, 2008, pp. 60-65 and J.C. Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain cit., pp. 128-145. 
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the start of the Eighteenth century. We must also remember that another area for the supply of white 
metal was the area of Rio de la Plata81, the port of Buenos Aires82, where the sporadic checks made 
by the Spanish authority favoured a boom in smuggling83. In addition, south Brazil, throughout the 
Eighteenth century, represented an excellent area for trading in legal and illegal goods, of which 
silver made up the most relevant part in the trade between the two Iberian mercantile communities.  
It is necessary to note that, after the political split of the Restauration of 1640, the Portuguese 
financial operators resident in the Spanish capital do not seem to have been influenced at all by the 
new political climate in Lisbon, indeed, their professional relationship with the crown of Philip IV 
seems to have been reinforced. Not even family bonds seem to have played a decisive role in the 
economic choices of the court banqueros. Lisbon, seen through the data of the production of its 
mint84, seems to be an economic reality totally free from the choices of the powerful conversos of the 
Spanish capital. The data collected therefore shows that the Mint of Lisbon did not supply the silver 
in the circuit of the Spanish asientos, as we would have thought, but it is plausible to suppose that 
the precious metal needed to feed the Portuguese monetary circuit came mainly from the 
participation of the Portuguese in trade linked to the Spanish colonies in South America. 
The third mint that I intend to examine is that of London. As has been shown, the increase in 
Portuguese loans to the Spanish Crown does not seem to have had any repercussions for the 
activity of the Mint of Lisbon, but it certainly changed, for at least twenty years (1630-1650), the 
geography and dynamics of the process of redistribution of Iberian silver within the Atlantic area. In 
fact, after the peace of 1630 London transformed into one of the most active market for the Spanish 
silver, in strong competition with that of Genoa. But, unlike in the case of Genoa where the arrivals 
of precious metals were the responsibility of the Genoese operators, almost like a monopoly regime, 
in the case of the English mint it seems that the shipments were dominated by the Lusitanian 
bankers, especially in the period 1640-1647 when the Portuguese asientos represented the primary 
source of finance for the crown of Philip IV. The following chart presents the data for the production 
of silver money coined in the London Mint: 
 
                                 
________________________ 
81 On the presence of the Portuguese in that area see: A. Canabrava, O Comércio Português no Rio da Prata, 1580-1640, 
Belo Horizonte, 1984, M. da G. M. Ventura, Portugueses no Peru ao tempo da União Ibérica: mobilidade, 
cumplicidades e vivências, Lisboa, 2005 and L. F. Alencastro, O Trato dos viventes. Formação do Brasil no Atlântico 
Sul, São Paulo, 2000. 
82 Remember that the role of the colony of Sacramento became fundamental for the supply of silver by Portugal only from 
the end of the 1640s. 
83 Z. Moutoukias, Contrabando y control colonial en el siglo XVII, Buenos Aires, 1988. 
84 Arquivo da Casa da Moeda (Lisbon), Receita e Despesa, livros 862-955 (years 1607-1665). 
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                                    Chart 5 – London Mint (1621-65): Silver outputs (kg)85 
 
Sources: N. Mayhew, Silver in England cit. pp. 106-108; C. E. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint, cit., 
pp. 320-321. 
 
One can therefore suggest that the “English Road” (according to the definition by Harland Taylor), 
functioned until 1648 (see Chart 5), in which year the Peace of Westphalia was signed, that allowed Spain 
to finally realise the old project of buying white metal on the market of Amsterdam at the expense of English 
mediation.  Furthermore, this trade in Spanish silver with the Royal Mint seems to have been impeded by 
the changed geo-political European scene.  Indeed, the English Navigation Act of 1651, responsible for the 




5. The activity of the Mints of Genoa, Lisbon and London and the Spanish silver 
 
A Finally, it is interesting to observe the correlation between the asientos signed in support of 




85  For the production of silver coins by the London Mint (1639-1645) it is calculated according to an annual average 
because the available official data were not collected over the same calendar year. 
87 No evidence for the years: 1634 and 1637. No bullion inputs for the years 1636 and 1650. 
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 Table 7 – 1621-1648: Asientos for Flanders (Genoese and Portuguese) and entries of silver into 
the Mints % 
 Asientos for Flanders (Kg.) Entries of silver into the mints (%)  
compared to the value of the asientos 
Periods Total Genoese  Portuguese Lisbon87 London Genoa 
1621-30 10.428.948 8.333.104 2.095.844 5,11 % 0,37 % 3,74 % 
1631-40 11.090.340 5.233.432 5.856.908 1,29 % 3,22 % 5,66 % 
1641-48 7.683.708 1.787.963 5.895.745 0,44 % 7,72 % 2,78 % 
Sources: A. Marcos Martín, “España y Flandes (1618-1648): la financiación de la guerra” cit.?? 
 
In conclusion, from the data presented here (Table 7), we can deduce that the Mint of Lisbon, 
right in the decade of maximum financial power of the Portuguese bankers in relation to the Spanish 
Treasury (1631-1640), was the less important buyer of American precious metal. The tendency of 
the Portuguese Mint to not buy silver coming from Madrid continued in a more evident way during 
the next decade, when London imposed itself as the “best client” of the banqueros of Philip IV.  With 
regard to the Royal Mint, in the period 1641-1648, London added to the peak in acquisitions of 
Spanish precious metal, a fact that reinforces the hypothesis of a growing dependence on the 
financial circuit of the Portuguese. The Mint of Lisbon, by contrast, did not exploit the opportunity to 
acquire silver bullion from their compatriots resident in the Spanish capital, trade that instead fed the 
English Mint.  In the period 1621-1640, we presume that 6.40% of silver negotiated through the 
asientos - destined to fund the war in Flanders - could therefore have been acquired by the Casa da 
Moeda in Lisbon, while 9.40% could have been destined for the Genoese mint, which reveals a 
peculiar chronology in the control of trade in precious metal over a crucial twenty year period in 
European history. 
One last hypothesis: if we compare the values of the asientos signed by Portuguese and 
Genoese bankers with the levels of production of the single mints, what can we observe? In the 
case of Lisbon in the years 1621-1630, the mint bought silver of a value equal to 25.47% of the 
metal contracted to the Portuguese bankers. This percentage reduced by 2.44% in the period 1631-
1640 and by 0.58% in the years 1641-1648. In the case of Genoa the percentage of silver 
purchased by its mint, in respect to that dealt with by Genoese financiers resident in Madrid, was 
4.68% (1621-1630), then growing to 12% (1631-1640) and ending up at 11.97% in the years 1641-






The central question posed in this article is whether the silver distributed through the 
mechanism of the Spanish asientos is relevant for the activity of the mints analysed here. We can 
affirm, in conclusion, how it is necessary to distinguish between two different situations. In the case 
of the mints of Genoa and London a strong link has emerged between the financial circuit controlled 
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by the Genoese and Portuguese bankers. However, in the case of Lisbon a positive correlation has 
been found in the balance of Portuguese trade in respect to its relationship with Spain and its 
colonies in South America. Therefore, it is thanks to that positive balance of trade that Lisbon was 
able to obtain a large part of the silver needed to support its own monetary market. 
In short, the Mints of Genoa and London utilised more efficiently the silver market derived 
from the Spanish asientos in respect to the Portuguese mint. This suggests that beyond a new 
climate of collaboration between the Iberian and British authorities, facilitated by the peace of 1630, 
and the silver trade coordinated by Portuguese bankers; also the extensive network of the Sephardic 
community in Antwerp and Amsterdam collaborated with the business community of London. 
In the case of Lisbon, if we exclude the three years from 1626-1628, there does not seem to 
have been great cooperation between its mint and the group of Lusitanian bankers involved in 
financing Philip IV. Nor during the years of the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal did the 
administrators of the mint show interest in attracting silver from Madrid, which makes it logical to 
suggest that the mint price paid by the Casa de Moeda of Lisbon was perhaps less than that agreed 
by the Lusitanian bankers with the Royal Mint.  But why did the ingots of Spanish silver not interest 
the Portuguese mint?  In other words, are we facing a short-sighted political choice on the part of the 
Lisbon administrators who were unable to attract the precious metal into their own coffers?  On the 
contrary, the Portuguese Mint was not intended to pay a higher price for the silver offered by the 
banqueros of Madrid, because there was already a sufficient amount of silver available on the 
domestic market to the economic operators.  In fact, we note that throughout the 1640s, the level of 
production of white coins was very steady (see Chart 4). Therefore, we can hypothesise that in 
those years there existed in the monetary circuit of Lisbon a notable quantity of silver that did not 
consist of ingots coming from the Hacienda Real in Madrid, but rather from the activity of melting 
down and recasting Spanish coins already present in the Portuguese territory88. 
 
________________________ 
88 For the legislation linked to the activity of the Casa da Moeda di Lisbona see: Teixeira de Aragão, Descripção Geral e 
Histórica das moedas cunhadas em nome dos Reis, Regentes e Governadores de Portugal, Lisboa, 1877. 
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                                Appendix A - Loans to the Spanish Crown (1618-1648)89 
 














1618 1.852.372 612.972  100,00   
1619 1.611.305 655.245  100,00   
1620 1.316.198 559.425  100,00   
1621 2.165.249 1.131.296 1.131.296 100,00   
1622 1.663.478 933.549 933.549 100,00   
1623 2.559.687 1.282.308 1.106.167 86,26   
1624 2.912.319 1.188.953 889.513 74,81   
1625 2.917.603 1.316.127 1.225.943 93,15 4.227 0,32 
1626 2.846.443 1.370.379 1.123.781 82,01 140.913 10,28 
1627 2.317.608 1.069.529 565.766 52,90 415.693 38,87 
1628 2.415.626 1.225.943 838.432 68,39 387.511 31,61 
1629 2.146.855 1.129.278 360.129 31,89 522.551 46,27 
1630 1.571.326 784.781 158.527 20,20 624.949 79,63 
1631 2.446.471 1.348.703 378.954 28,10 427.877 31,73 
1632 1.837.838 1.217.965 218.325 17,93 533.003 43,76 
1633 3.623.551 1.905.341 675.229 35,44 544.326 28,57 
1634 3.063.181 1.805.848 592.285 32,80 704.989 39,04 
1635 3.728.506 1.765.566 858.727 48,64 532.143 30,14 
1636 2.662.039 1.363.753 540.516 39,63 610.949 44,80 
1637 3.371.508 1.899.368 635.754 33,47 799.443 42,09 
1638 3.305.986 1.393.139 539.387 38,72 641.464 46,04 
1639 3.631.859 1.500.938 522.083 34,78 663.700 44,22 
1640 2.919.321 1.156.845 272.173 23,53 399.012 34,49 
1641 3.981.374 2.494.740 288.871 11,58 1.473.610 59,07 
1642 5.100.518 2.218.719 309.022 13,93 1.570.587 70,79 
1643 2.967.901 1.562.519 146.479 9,37 868.312 55,57 
1644 2.673.185 956.007 174.028 18,20 509.665 53,31 
1645 2.654.654 1.216.079 193.797 15,94 793.799 65,28 
1646   -  -  
1647 2.898.917 1.004.172 268.527 26,74 439.164 43,73 
1648 2.345.710 853.580 407.239 47,71 240.609 28,19 
Total 81.508.590 38.923.071 17.182.141  13.848.497  
Source: A. Marcos Martín, “España y Flandes (1618-1648): la financiación de la guerra” cit., pp. 20; 36. 
 
________________________ 
89  With regard to the asientos destined for Flanders we still need to clarify the amounts presented by Marcos Martín, 
differentiating them from those published by Geoffrey Parker. 
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1621 11.680 33  
1622 6.379 2.311 33.168 
1623 45.434 3.778 118.376 
1624 84.840 5.270 40.242 
1625 128.270 11.527 94.208 
1626 69.183 8.055 17.276 
1627 299.106 5.740 30.727 
1628 225.081 1.105  
1629 48.004 538 14.458 
1630 96.168 404 41.754 
1631 38.481 562 98.130 
1632 51.606 7.522 11.898 
1633 8.628 17.151 85.321 
1634  21.125 81.512 
1635 620 30.413 105.951 
1636  14.644 40.017 
1637  44.735 24.799 
1638 8.008 58.481 74.205 
1639 31.322 81.333 17.417 
1640 12.712 81.333 88.655 
1641 89.778 81.333 17.929 
1642 79.557 81.333 36.158 
1643 320.798 81.333 28.287 
1644 421.893 81.333 3.500 
1645 179.400 81.333 121 
1646 188.973 91.959 18.814 
1647 64.975 83.652 52.632 
1648 56.267 10.845 56.493 
1649 43.573 4.787 176.291 
1650 20.197 4.787 96.169 
 
Sources: G. Felloni, Profilo economico delle monete genovesi cit., pp. 320-322 and U. Meroni, I "Libri delle 
uscite delle monete" della Zecca di Genova cit., pp. 56-106 (GENOA); N. Mayhew, Silver in England cit., pp. 
106-108 and C. E. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint cit., pp. 320-321 (LONDON); Arquivo da Casa da 
Moeda (Lisboa), Receita e Despesa, livros 862-955 (years 1607-1665), and F. Mauro, Portugal, o Brasil e o 
Atlântico (1570-1670), Lisboa, 1989, p. 182 (LISBOA)
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